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AND ESSENCE
BY VICTOR S. YARROS
OF all contemporary metaphysicians and philosophers, Mr.
George Santayana, formerly of the Harvard University and
the United States, but always an urbane and candid internationalist,
is perhaps the most original and independent. He has few formal
followers, but all schools of philosophy treat him with atTectionate
regard. He is romantic, skeptical, subtle, cultivated, severel\- logi-
cal, vet never dogmatic or pedantic. He writes uncommonly well
—is, in fact, a poet as well as an exquisite prose writer. He loves
distinctions, shades and nuiances, but he never mistakes hypothesis
for demonstrated theory, assumption for fact, and he never ven-
tures be\-ond proof without warning his readers or auditors of that
excursion.
Mr. Santayana is a gifted and happy phrase-maker. He does
not, however, take his intriguing and thought-provoking phrases
too seriously. "Animal faith"' was his invention, and he remains
loyal to the doctrine expressed or implied in that phrase.
He has just published the third and concluding volume of his
philosophic trilogy, and he entitles it "The Realm of Matter." In
previous volumes, that deserve to be better known than the\- are
to the younger students, he discussed the realm of essence, skepti-
cism and the sort of instinctive, unescapable faith he called "animal."
His leading ideas are now quite clear, and it is possible to ana-
lyze them and examine the arguments advanced in their support in
the three attractive, erudite, graceful and profound books.
]\Ir. Santayana calls himself a materialist, but his materialism is
his own and is different from the cruder and more naive material-
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ism of older schools of thought. He is evidently satisfied that the
new physics, new metaphysics, new mathematics, new logic and
new psychology have not rehabilitated either idealism, spiritualism
or dogmatic religion. He has been reproached by some critics for
ignoring the remarkable contributions of Whitehead, Eddington,
Jeans and other eminent contemporary philosophers who build on
scientific foundations, but the criticism is hardly fair. It is clear
that he is conversant with the best work of the thinkers named.
Their quintessential contributions have not escaped his notice, but
he believes, and rightly, that those conclusions do not seriousl\' af-
fect his position or his main line of argument.
After all, whether one is a materialist depends on his definition
of the term materialism. Santayana calls himself a materialist, be-
cause his definition of that term is not the traditional or ordinary
one. Here is his explanation of the prejudice felt against the term.
The objection to materialism, he holds, is due to two cardinal
misconceptions—first, that matter is inert, or dead, or gross and
vulgar, and, second, that in a material universe there would be no
place for what moralists, philosophers and artists call values. P>ut
nothing could be more arbitrary or absurd than these conceptions,
he affirms.
Special manifestations of matter are distinguishable from its
essence. The human body is material, but so is wind or sunshine.
"W^eight and figure are not more characteristic of matter than are
explosiveness. swiftness, fertility and radiation." As to values,
they are defined by Santayana as expressions of human preference,
and certainly preferences are in one sense objective facts. Human
aims and aspirations are not determined by this or that description
or even interpretation of the universe.
Wliat. then, is the relation between our material constitution
and our spiritual and moral values ? Santayana answers
:
"Reason is not a force contrary to the passions, but a harmony
possible among them. Except in their interests, it could have no
point of application, nothing to beautify, nothing to dominate. It
is, therefore, by a complete illusion, though an excusable one, that
the spirit denies its material basis and calls its body a prison or a
tomb."
But philosophy should not fall into the same blunder, excusable
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as it may be to the moralist. Philosophy should not deny the ma-
terial basis of life or of human value.
What is the mo.st important implication of Santayana's materil-
ism? This—that the external world is real and substantial. The
human mind cannot indeed question the reality of the world. It
may do so in words, but the words are without meaning. They
express no idea. "The postulate of substance—the assumption that
there are things and events prior to the discovery of them and in-
dependent of this discovery—underlies all natural knowledge,''
while the denial of the postulate "rescinds that animal faith or that
common sense which is the beginning of art and science."
Yet the postulate must always remain an assumption. We can-
not prove it. Ikit the proof is not necessary to any human activitw
Animal faith suffices. We cannot think or act without the faith,
the assumption. With it, we can do that which as human beings
we wish to do in our own moral world. The obstacles are \\ithin
us, and so are the means of overcoming the obstacles.
Nothing is to be gained by adopting a strictly idealistic attitude,
for idealism has to be abandoned the moment we undertake to act,
or to apply our thoughts to actual problems. That is, the idealist
cannot dispense with animal faith or common sense. He denies
the postulate even while using it. Such futility discredits philos-
ophy and metaphysics.
At the same time, the assumption in question does not exclude
a certain kind of Skepticism. Santayana claims to be a thorough
skeptic. For he holds that skepticism, if kept in the right place,
safeguards and even increases the freedom of the spirit. "Ultimate
skepticism," he says, "is a sanctuary from grosser illusions."
In the realm of matter animal faith of necessity counts as knowl-
edge, but there are vast realms beyond matter, and these realms are
the possession of the spirit.
]\Ian lives on several levels, Santayana maintains with the other
humanists. Ikit the lowest level is the substructure of the highest.
Spirituality adds consciousness in man, but does not abolish in-
stinct. The ideal world of man emerges from the real world, and
the latter is the less important though of course essential.
How skepticism leads to pure enjoyment is thus explained by
Santayana
:
"When by a difficult suspension of judgment I have deprived a
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given image of all adventitious significance; when it is taken neither
for the manifestation of a substance, nor for an idea in the mind,
nor for an event in the world, but. simply, if a color for that color,
and if music for that music, and if a face for that face, then an
immense cognitive certitude compensates me for so much cognitive
abtention. My skepticism at last has touched bottom, and my doubt
has found honorable rest in the absolutely indubitable."
The skeptic and the materialist is also a neo-Platonist. Animal
faith is not in his philosophy incompatible with contemplation of
the realm of Essence. Essences are more than ideas; ideas are
born of matter and are instruments of science on the plane of exis-
tence. But essences, he says, are not exhausted by their utilitarian
character. They remain and give the highest value to human life.
To live spiritually is to live in the realm of essences. Beauty is an
essence, and the spirit revels in it. It cannot be isolated or impri-
soned within any given idea, and it is certainly not a property of
the low level of substance or existence. But beauty is absolutely
indubitable, as are other essences. By contemplation of essences
man at last transcends animal faith and becomes spiritual and
human.
Santayana's philosophy has been described as "the seesthetic way
of life." That does not seem to be particularly apt. Life without
art and aesthetics would be animal indeed, but Santayana is not
blind to moral beauty—beauty in conduct and in social relations.
He demands the full, abundant life for all, and the only question
is, What is the road to that goal?
To Santayana, the answer is—Through animal faith, in the first
place, or candid and courageous facing of Reality ; then through
the practice of a gentle skepticism in the vast realm of Matter,
which realm is yet to be treated as real and substantial, and, finally,
through the right steps in the realm of Essence.
There are modern, scientific thinkers who assert that science
and philosophy are reverting to Berkleyan Idealism, to the view
that nothing exists save pure thought, either in human minds or,
in the last analysis, in the mind of the Creator. To Santayana this
conception is utterly unscientific and even empty of any meaning.
Nothing we say disposes of the distinction between matter and idea,
or essence. Why not accept the distinction and see what we can
build on it? Santayana has built upon it, and his system, called
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romantic, is in truth very substantial. His terms may appear arbi-
trary, but we cannot argue away the facts and realities which they
denote.
Time and philosophic tide may work out a reconciliation be-
tween the old idealism and the new and critical realism. Hut mean-
time there is no virtue or guidance in the postulate of a Creator
who is unknowable and inscrutable, and whose designs are un-
fathomable. In the realm of essence there is no need or room for
God, unless God is merely another name for nature in its totality-
and infinite complexity and diversity.
